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The Power of Warm Glow 
Usha Rodrigues 
Professor Brian Galle’s Keep Charity Charitable1 is a thoughtful 
contribution to the ongoing conversation about the proper tax treatment of 
charitable organizations.  I largely agree with Galle’s arguments, but I would 
like to offer two criticisms of his positions: first, Galle overstates the problem 
posed by for-profit firms offering charitable services; and second, he 
understates the power of “warm glow” in the nonprofit organization. 
Galle responds chiefly to a provocative 2007 essay by Anup Malani and 
Eric Posner, who suggested that for-profit firms that engage in charitable 
work should be taxed like their nonprofit charitable equivalents, Section 
501(c)(3) organizations.2  They argue that if a for-profit organization 
dedicates itself to charitable work, it should not pay federal taxes on its 
income, and any contributions made to the for-profit should be tax deductible 
to the donor.3 
Alluring, isn’t it?  All Malani and Posner are saying is: Give for-profits 
a chance.4  If for-profits do the same good work nonprofits do, they should be 
taxed equally.5  On the face of things, that seems only fair.  As pie-in-the-sky 
thought experiments go, it’s a beauty. 
 Enter Professor Galle, who sets out to make mincemeat of the 
Malani–Posnerian pie.  Galle argues that “society perceiv[ing] an 
organization as charitable is a critical element of the entity’s success.”6   This 
 
1. 88 TEXAS L. REV. 1213 (2010). 
2. Anup Malani & Eric A. Posner, The Case for Non-profit Charities, 93 VA. L. REV. 2017 
(2007). 
3. Id. at 2025–27. 
4. Id. at 2065. 
5. Id. at 2023. 
6. Galle, supra note 1, at 1215. 
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observation is spot-on, although I will suggest a little later that Galle does not 
develop it quite as far as he can.   Let me first, however, offer a few 
observations about Galle’s other criticisms of the Malani–Posner proposal.  
Like almost everyone, Malani and Posner take Henry Hansmann’s elegant 
contract-failure theory as a starting point for analyzing nonprofits.7  In his 
seminal work The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, Hansmann argued that the 
nonprofit form’s nondistribution constraint—its hallmark—arises because of 
the gap between the donor to a charity and the beneficiary of that charity.8  
For example, say that you are trying to help recent earthquake victims, and 
you discover an organization named “Help to Haiti” that purports to be able 
to feed and house these individuals.  Your problem as a donor is that you 
can’t directly ask the Haitians you’ve tried to help though this organization if 
your money actually went to them or was instead siphoned off by the 
managers of Help to Haiti.9  But, as Hansmann’s story goes, if that 
intermediary is bound by the nondistribution constraint, and thus has no 
owners because it is constitutively prohibited from taking profits, at least you 
have some comfort that your donation will really aid the needy Haitians you 
mean to assist. 
Cold comfort, say Malani and Posner.  They point out that a for-profit 
firm can achieve by contract the same assurance that is provided by the 
structural nondistribution constraint imposed on nonprofits by law.10  All the 
private firm need do, according to Malani and Posner, is to agree with donors 
not to distribute profits in excess of a specified amount and then hire a 
professional monitor to police the contractual arrangement.11  Indeed, in the 
universe envisioned by Malani and Posner, use of for-profit charities will be 
better for donors because the profit motive will discipline for-profit firm 
managers to operate efficiently so that donations will be used in the most 
cost-effective and productive ways.12  Galle answers, quite rightly, that 
credible monitoring is costly, and monitoring costs currently borne by the 
public at large would fall disproportionately on small charities.13 
 While Galle’s responses to Malani and Posner are in general well 
reasoned, in two respects they seem to me to fall short.  My first concern 
stems from Galle’s discussion of “mixed firms,” that is, firms that engage in 
both charitable and noncharitable work.14  The principle espoused by Malani 
and Posner logically extends to these firms.  Thus, for example, when 
 
7. Malani & Posner, supra note 2, at 2035 & n.33. 
8. Henry B. Hansmann, The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise, 89 YALE L.J. 835, 838, 848 (1980). 
9. Of course, consumer-protection laws, like false advertising, also now help protect against this 
type of fraud but were less developed when the nonprofit form arose. 
10. Malani & Posner, supra note 2, at 2035. 
11. Id. at 2035–36. 
12. Id. at 2022. 
13. Galle, supra note 1, at 1219. 
14. Id. 
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Starbucks sells “Fair Trade Coffee” or Delta Airlines offers carbon credits 
for a ticket purchase, corporations should receive the same tax benefit as do 
nonprofit entities.15  Galle objects that sorting a firm’s noncharitable work 
from its for-profit work would be unduly burdensome in the “mixed-firm” 
world.16  I worry, however, that on this point Galle has overplayed his hand.  
The need for costly third-party monitoring, after all, seems far less important 
for firms such as Starbucks or Delta Airlines than for the archetypal case of a 
start-up for-profit charity.  Starbucks and Delta enjoy valuable brands.  As a 
result, the marginal return to them of skimping or cheating in their charitable 
enterprises would not be worth the loss of reputational capital they would 
suffer if they were exposed as exploiting farmers for a profit or knowingly 
lining their pockets instead of decreasing emissions. In contrast, start-up 
entities, with less of a name to lose, would be much more in need of the 
services of a costly professional outside monitor. This point may grow in 
significance given the recent surge in for-profit mixed-charitable activities. 
My second concern focuses on Galle’s treatment of “warm glow,” a 
specific kind of utility that comes from giving.  The threat of agency costs—
that is, the threat that the firm’s managers are shirking, stealing, or otherwise 
not serving their principal’s interests—lurks in every organizational form, 
from general partnership to corporation to nonprofit.  Malani and Posner 
argue that for-profits offer lowered agency costs because nonprofit managers 
may more aggressively rent seek or slack on the job.17  In contrast, if working 
at a nonprofit offered the possibility of a profit, and the attendant increase in 
wages a healthy profit promises, then more talented managers focused on 
delivering the best services would seek employment in the for-profit 
charitable-business sector.18 
Galle is unconvinced.  He says that many employees are motivated to 
work for charitable entities precisely because “peers will know that the 
employee is making a sacrifice.”19  And this drive to warm-glow 
compensation reduces costs unrelated to the charitable mission.  Put another 
way, nonprofit managers are “true believers” who are less likely to rent seek 
or tolerate inflated administration costs because such behavior is 
incompatible with the “mission” they have chosen to make their own work.20  
Thus, warm glow functions as a strong form of norm, policing agency costs 
 
15. Malani & Posner, supra note 2, at 2062–63. 
16. See Galle, supra note 1, at 1220 (explaining how mixing charitable and noncharitable 
enterprises in the same firm would require the IRS to identify charitable functions with much more 
specificity than it does today). 
17. See Malani & Posner, supra note 2, at 2055–56 (asserting that competition amongst 
nonprofits is at such an insufficient level that managers will act to improve the performance of the 
nonprofit only when it is threatened with insolvency). 
18. Id. at 2056. 
19. Galle, supra note 1, at 1223. 
20. Id. at 1224. 
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not through custom but through constitution in a way that naturally 
suppresses behavior that is incompatible with the organization’s purpose.21  
By this logic, flying first-class on a humanitarian mission would be 
incoherent.22  Thus, locating the charitable enterprise within a for-profit 
organization—as Malani and Posner would have us do—irreparably 
cheapens it, “undermin[ing] the benefits of warm glow for everyone.”23  Any 
gain in talent is more than offset by the heightened costs of monitoring and, 
even more, by the destruction of the warm glow. 
 Galle’s assessment of warm glow’s benefits is persuasive, but I would 
suggest that it is incomplete because it focuses only on employees.  Just as 
employee’s warm glow is dimmed by participating in a for-profit charity, so 
too is a donor’s warm glow diminished.24  Imagine that the individual who 
wants to help the Haitian homeless can choose between two organizations.  
One is a nonprofit.  The other, a for-profit, contracts that it will pay 80 cents 
on the dollar to the Haitians and further contracts with 
PricewaterhouseCoopers to monitor its results.  The understanding is that the 
entrepreneur will pocket 20% of all donations, minus administrative costs. 
From the donor’s perspective, one clear danger is that the for-profit 
would skimp on quality outputs to decrease administrative costs.25  But there 
is an even deeper problem—the very knowledge of the profit making by the 
owners of the charity dims the donor’s warm glow.26   The difficulty is that 
the transaction is no longer about caring individuals coming together to help 
suffering Haitians.  It is instead about forming an uneasy alliance between 
altruistic donors and entrepreneurs bent on making a buck.  Knowledge of 
the economics of the transaction, the ultimate profit motive of the for-profit 
charity entrepreneur, the risk of contract failure, and the inability to measure 
desired outputs combine inexorably to produce the suspicion that the donor is 
really just a sucker. 
In short, there is something very special about charitable warm glow.  
For example, a local nonprofit food cooperative is selling more than the free-
range eggs or organic strawberries that Whole Foods and other for-profits 
market so effectively.  The co-op offers community participation and an 
investment in local farms, a distinctive ethos that is incompatible with the 
 
21. Id. at 1224–25. 
22. Naturally the reader can think of charities rife with clear rent seeking—United Way springs 
to mind. But agency costs are present in firms of every organizational stripe, from partnership to 
for-profit corporation.  The point is that agency costs are less prominent in nonprofits than one 
might expect because of warm-glow mechanism. 
23. Galle, supra note 1, at 1224. 
24. Indeed, Galle himself suggests this point by observing that individuals can derive warm 
glow from participating in charity, and that may be a significant motivation behind giving.  But 
Galle’s focus is on the incentives of a charity’s employees, not its potential donors. 
25. Galle, supra note 1, at 1228. 
26. Id. at 1224–25. 
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profit motive and closely connected to the construction of an individual’s 
social identity.  I explore the special nature of the nonprofit more fully, and 
link it to the psychological concept of social identity, in a separate work— 
Entity and Identity—forthcoming in the Emory Law Journal. 27   This sense 
of social identity is separate and apart from the warm glow that giving to a 
charitable nonprofit creates. Yet by generating both of these important 
values, the nonprofit form imparts something that the for-profit form cannot.  
The implication of this idea may be surprising: Malani and Posner’s 
suggestion of equal taxation of for-profit and nonprofit charitable activities 
may not disadvantage nonprofits much at all.  Even in a tax-neutral world, at 
least some nonprofits would continue to flourish because they offer a special 
kind of warm glow that for-profits cannot provide, the warm glow of 
participating in a nonprofit organization. 
 Brian Galle’s article makes an important contribution to the nonprofit 
debate by revealing subtle difficulties in the approach taken by Malani and 
Posner.  I agree with Galle that the nonprofit charities cannot be reduced to 
their tax-exempt status.  Still, his discussion of mixed-firm charitable activity 
seems overly alarmist, given the realities of mixed-firm charitable work.  His 
view of warm glow focuses on employees at the cost of assessing the power 
of warm-glow effects on all participants of a nonprofit charity.  These 
differences aside, I look forward to continuing—both with Galle and 
others—the larger conversation about the role of nonprofits in our society. 
 
27. Usha Rodrigues, Entity and Identity, 59 EMORY L. J. (forthcoming 2010). 
